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FOREWORD
DIANE F. ORENTLICHER
Describing the conference whose proceedings are published in this
volume, veteran correspondent Roy Gutman observed that there was
a "sense of electricity" as the top leadership of the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Tribunals came together at the Washington College of Law
to assess the brief, but already rich, record of the Tribunals and to
mine their experiences for lessons that might usefully guide preparations for a permanent international criminal court. Throughout the
conference one had the sense, Gutman remarked, that a whole area of
law-one that concerns the deepest interests of humanity-was
coming to life.
That a conference devoted to international tribunals could evoke
this response would have been difficult to imagine even a few years
ago. The early history of both ad hoc tribunals provided more cause
for concern than confidence: It took more than one year after the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
was established for the Security Council to appoint its first Chief
Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, and in its early years one of the most
widely known facts about the tribunal was that it was unable to secure custody of the vast majority of those whom it had indicted. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") had an even
less auspicious start. As Ambassador David Scheffer recalled in his
conference remarks, a United Nations audit released in February
1997 found that the ICTR was afflicted by gross mismanagement.
Shortly after the report's release, the United Nations discharged two
of the ICTR's most senior officials.
In larger perspective, as Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour suggested in her conference address, the very fact that the tribunals were
created bore stark witness to profound failures. For criminal law is
brought to bear, in her words, only when "things have dramatically
gone wrong."
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In the former Yugoslavia, what went dramatically wrong came to
be known as "ethnic cleansing"--a cynical euphemism for the systematic extermination of individuals belonging to another national
group. What went dramatically wrong, as well, was the wholesale
failure of political leaders to respond effectively when confronted
with the worst war crimes in Europe since World War II.
In Rwanda, things went dramatically wrong in April 1994, the beginning of a genocide that consumed Tutsi victims at a rate three to
four times that at which the Nazi machinery of death claimed Jewish
victims. And again, the world stood aside.
It was against the backdrop of these failures that the United Nations Security Council created the first international criminal courts
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. It was small wonder, then,
that the ICTY, established in May 1993, was at first widely seen as a
figleaf for Western States' unwillingness to intervene to stop the carnage then underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the ICTR was
established in November 1994, there was equal cause for cynicism:
the United Nations not only failed to intervene to stop the genocide
in Rwanda, it withdrew troops already deployed in Rwanda when the
genocide began, leaving just a token force. Testifying in the first trial
before the ICTR, the commander of the United Nations force in
Rwanda, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, estimated that if he had
had 50,000 troops he could have stopped the genocide. If this were
not cause enough to question the legitimacy of the Security Council's
action in establishing the ICTR, many doubted whether it would
have done even this much had it not already created a tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
Yet despite the inauspicious circumstances surrounding their creation and continuing challenges to their authority, both the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda tribunals have emerged as credible and increasingly effective institutions of justice. Their history to date has been a study
in the steady-if still incomplete-triumph of professionalism over
cynicism and of an emerging global constituency for justice over a
pervasive culture of impunity.

FOREWORD
DOING JUSTICE IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES

No court in history has had to confront the formidable range of obstacles to mounting effective and fair trials that have beset the first
cases tried before the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals. Even the
basic task of obtaining evidence has presented singular challenges.
Alan Tieger, lead prosecutor in the ICTY's first case, Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic, and Michail Wladimiroff, defense counsel for Tadic,
recalled the extraordinary obstacles they faced in trying to obtain
testimonial evidence-the lynchpin of prosecutions before the ad hoc
tribunals. As Mr. Tieger recalled, the three and one-half year conflict
in Bosnia was still underway when he and his colleagues undertook
their investigatory work. Those responsible for the atrocities committed during the conflict were still very much in control, and threatened to arrest ICTY staff if they undertook on-site inquiries. In these
circumstances, Mr. Tieger reminded us, he and his colleagues could
not have foreseen that the fighting would be brought to an end by the
Dayton Peace Agreement in late 1995 or that a NATO Implementation Force ("IFOW'), deployed to help enforce that agreement, would
be available to provide security to ICTY investigators. Many key
witnesses had scattered-an intended consequence of "ethnic
cleansing"--and had to be tracked down by Mr. Tieger in fourteen
countries. And there was no assurance that witnesses, once located,
"would be willing to risk re-traumatization and even physical retaliation for testifying publicly."
The obstacles were no less daunting for defense counsel as they
tried to locate witnesses in the Serb-controlled area of Bosnia where
Dusko Tadic's alleged crimes were committed. Serb authorities
"harassed and jailed people" after Mr. Wladimiroff had spoken to
them. Further, he recalled, "witnesses, once located, disappeared, not
only because of the threats of local authorities, but also as a result of
the ongoing conflict. They simply were displaced. They were refugees. We could no longer locate them."
If anything, the challenges confronting the ICTR were more formidable still. That an armed conflict is still underway in Rwanda has
had a profound impact on the Tribunal's efforts. Few of us can
fathom what it means for a court to undertake its work under the
conditions described by ICTR judge Navanethem Pillay: "I am...
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sad to say that there were two attempts at hijacking the Tribunal's
staff and two people were shot, but not fatally. There is an ongoing
conflict and a real risk to witnesses as well as a risk to Tribunal
staff."
No blueprint was available to guide the two tribunals as they confronted these challenges; innovation was in order. For example, the
ICTY Trial Chamber that conducted the Tadic trial established a
video link to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia to take live testimony
from defense witnesses who were unwilling to travel to The Hague.
But any measure undertaken to meet the peculiar challenges confronting the tribunals had to meet the stringent demands of fair process. Panelists puzzled through the vexing question of what constitutes a fair trial in the unprecedented setting of the Hague Tribunal.
As their discussion made clear, the answer is by no means selfevident. For, as Mr. Wladimiroff noted, "the concept of a fair trial
should and can only be understood in the context of the system in
which it functions." Yet the ICTY did not function within any established legal system and therefore lacked established benchmarks of
fairness against which its innovations could readily be measured. To
the contrary, its judges sought to construct a genuinely inter-national
code of procedure, drawn from all major legal systems. (In fact, as
presiding Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald observed, there were six
different legal systems represented in the Tadic trial alone.)
In this uncharted setting, some of the Tribunal's early rulings were
bound to be controversial-perhaps none more so than the decision
to allow, in exceptional circumstances, certain witnesses to remain
anonymous. The conference at American University's Washington
College of Law afforded an unprecedented opportunity for the lead
actors in the Tadic trial to confront together the fundamental fairness
of this and other controversial rulings. Their exchanges were rich and
genuinely illuminating; many of the insights that emerged were surprising even to avid students of the ICTY. Mr. Wladimiroff concluded, for example, that on the whole the Trial Chamber's rulings
on witness protection, far from unfairly prejudicing the defense as
has sometimes been charged, served defense needs as well as those
of the prosecution. "This was," he noted, "a very astonishing thing to
me.

FOREWORD
OPERATING IN AN INSTITUTIONAL VACUUM

While many commentators have remarked upon the degree to
which the ad hoc tribunals represent an incursion on time-honored
principles of state sovereignty, the experience of those who participate in their daily work highlights the reverse side of the proverbial
coin-the costs of being unrooted in an established state system. All
who have participated in the work of the tribunals have been profoundly affected by this phenomenon. Thus, for example, Mr.
Wladimiroff observed: "The reality was that the defense was not an
entity, not an organ of the Tribunal, and therefore, non-existent for
[states whose cooperation with the Tribunal was essential]. I had no
access to any official authority and I had no way to track down the
witnesses." Ultimately, the particular challenges to which he alluded
were satisfactorily resolved by the Tribunal itself-another instance
in which essential pillars of a functioning judicial system had to be
improvised even as the Tribunal sought to dispense justice.
Other fundamental challenges relating to the fact that the ad hoc
tribunals are not embedded in established state structures were elucidated by two officers on whose shoulders the resulting burdens rest
heavily-the President of the ICTY, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, and the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTYiR, Madame Justice Louise
Arbour. Where most courts operate within an established legal
structure, Judge McDonald reminded the audience, the ICTY "'depends entirely on... States" to carry out essential tasks relating to
the fair and effective administration of justice. The tribunal cannot
even "offer practical protection to witnesses who are at risk by virtue
of the fact that they have assisted the Tribunal" once they leave its
premises. And without a police force of its own, the Tribunal has had
to rely on others to arrest those whom it has indicted. At the time of
her remarks, forty-nine suspects who had been publicly indicted by
the ICTY remained at large; their continuing freedom, in Judge
McDonald's view, "makes a complete mockery of the Tribunal and
international criminal justice."
Justice Arbour also evoked the insidiously debilitating effects of
"the fact that an international court sits in a vacuum." Even a permanent international criminal court, she cautioned:
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our domestic criminal justice system. I speak, for instance of the absence
in areas of the world in which our work matters so much of a free and independent media. I can refer to what we take for granted domestically as
the following: the existence of an independent, but regulated profession;
and the unconditional endorsement of accountable governments who are
required to enforce the law. We cannot count on those two items.
More importantly, universal acceptance of the duty to give evidence in
criminal cases can be understood by all in our own society, but not in the
international arena.

Justice Arbour's allusion to the absence of an independent media
"in areas of the world in which our work matters so much" presuma-

bly referred to the former Yugoslavia, where virulently nationalist
media have at times presented grossly distorted accounts of the
ICTY's work. But in a more complicated way, the tribunals have suffered from their less than satisfactory relationship with independent
media.
Far removed from the daily cares of most societies, the ad hoc tribunals must work hard to remain in the foreground of a diffuse public's consciousness and concern. Yet too often, as journalist Kitty
Felde reminded conference participants, the tribunals have effectively discouraged press coverage that could help generate and sustain public support for their work-support that is critically important in countering states'

much-noted reticence to meet their

obligations toward the tribunals.
Equally important, the effectiveness of international tribunals depends crucially on the operation of critical watchdog sectors, including an independent media. Had the press reported more aggressively on the Rwanda Tribunal during its troubled early years, for
example, its problems of gross mismanagement might have been exposed-and addressed-much earlier. Instead, precious time was
lost.
With a permanent international criminal court on the horizon, issues of the accountability of international tribunals-courts that are
unrooted in any established state system-will assume even broader
importance. As they do, we would do well to heed Judge Pillay's call
for a departure from the ad hoc tribunals' characteristic opacity.

FOREWORD
CONFRONTING GRAND EVIL

However important in their own right, the daily challenges of doing justice in The Hague and Arusha matter above all because of the
profoundly important interests the tribunals were created to serve.
Bernard Muna, Deputy Prosecutor for the ICTR, suggested the
enormity of the task he has undertaken when he reminded the audience of the human tragedy that is the focus of his efforts:
You have heard that the genocide in Rwanda was five time faster than the
one in Germany, even though the German genocide had gas chambers. If
you take the lower figure of 500,000 people killed you are looking at
5,000 people a day. If you take the higher figure of one million people
killed, you are looking at 10,000 people killed a day without guillotines or
gas chambers. Instead, most of the killings were done with match heads
and spears. This meant that a large proportion of the population were implicated for this to succeed.

In his closing remarks at the conference, Aryeh Neier touched
upon a related aspect of the crimes committed in Bosnia and
Rwanda-what he called the "grotesque intimacy of the killers and
their victims in Bosnia and Rwanda." In this, the perpetrators of
"ethnic cleansing" and genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda have brought
a new permutation into the grim lexicon of mass atrocity; while the
Nazis deployed mobile killing units to exterminate their victims and
sent others to death camps, in Bosnia and Rwanda lifelong neighbors
were mobilized to commit sadistic crimes. In Mr. Neier's words, "the
killers knew their victims very well."
The direct participation of tens of thousands of ordinary people in
the massive crimes committed in Bosnia and Rwanda and the grotesque intimacy of the killers with their victims has presented peculiarly vexing challenges to prosecutors in The Hague and Arusha. As
Mr. Neier observed, these patterns have made "the question of collective guilt versus individual guilt a more troubling phenomenon
than we have ever dealt with previously."
How, if hundreds of thousands of Rwandans participated in genocidal murders, can the ICTR fairly select a finite number for prosecution? And, in light of the staggering evil described by Bernard
Muna, how can a court of law---one that seems to operate at an ex-
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quisitely slow pace-make a meaningful contribution? What would a
meaningful contribution be? What are the benchmarks of success for
tribunals like those established in The Hague and Arusha?
For Mr. Neier, one of the principal contributions the tribunals can
make is provoking a broad audience to confront its own responsibility for the crimes that took place, even while scrupulously hewing to
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. In Bernard Muna's
view, the ICTR can help prevent future genocides by laying bare the
truth of how it came to pass that hundreds of thousands of Rwandans
slaughtered as many as a million of their neighbors in three months'
time. Further, Mr. Muna noted, in the wake of such a tragedy, peaceful coexistence is difficult to contemplate absent a sense that some
measure ofjustice has been rendered.
In the view of Alan Tieger, the experience of witnesses in the Tadic trial served to justify faith in the healing and pacifying potential
of international tribunals. Many of the witnesses who had found the
courage to testify in The Hague, he recalled, experienced a sense
"that they had been relieved of a heavy burden that they had carried
for a long time." One such witness left the courtroom looking "ten or
fifteen years younger than when he arrived." It was those moments,
Tieger said, "that many of us felt most proud of our participation in
the Tribunal." In his view, the experiences of these witnesses vindicated the belief, on which the ICTY was at least partially predicated,
"that peace requires the sense of closure that only justice can provide."
These contributions, above all, may serve to justify confidence in
the redemptive power of the two tribunals. The possibility that the
tribunals could at least partially redeem past failures was eloquently
evoked by Justice Arbour in her conference remarks; suggesting that
the stunning failure of the international community to stop the
slaughter in Bosnia and Rwanda "can be modestly addressed and redeemed if we can now bring it amongst ourselves to hold these murderers, rapists, and torturers accountable for their actions." Justice
Arbour added: "This is, in fact, the last redemption...."

FO

frEORD

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

It is, of course, far too soon to take the measure of the ad hoc tribunals' success in redeeming the failures that led to their creationin particular, by contributing to the broader process of political accountability of which Aryeh Neier spoke and to the agonizing, and
agonizingly necessary, process of reckoning and reconciliation in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But in one important respect,
both tribunals' contributions can already be measured-and judged
an impressive success. Although the two tribunals have rendered
only a handful of verdicts, they have already made extraordinary
contributions to the development and consolidation of international
humanitarian law.
The substantive norms of international humanitarian law have, as
Professor Theodor Meron observed, "grown much more during these
last few years than in the half-century following Nuremberg."
Among the most important contributions in this respect has been the
Hague Tribunal's ruling in October 1995 that certain violations of
the laws of war applicable in situations of internal armed conflict are
international crimes-crimes that may be prosecuted by an international court and, indeed, by any national court pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction. In that same ruling, the ICTY resolved
at last an issue that has been debated by international jurists since the
postwar period-whether crimes against humanity must be linked to
armed conflict under customary international law. In the view of the
Tribunal, they need not.
Both tribunals have also made path-breaking contributions to the
jurisprudence of crimes of sexual assault. As outlined in the presentation of Patricia Viseur-Sellers, the Hague Tribunal has made clear
that rape can be prosecuted as a war crime, as a crime against humanity, and as an act of genocide when other elements of
those
crimes are established. And in the first verdict ever rendered by an
international court interpreting the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Arusha Tribunal
affirmed on September 2, 1998 that rapes are acts of genocide when
accompanied by genocidal intent. These rulings stand in stark contrast to the judgment at Nuremberg, which omitted any mention of
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crimes of sexual assault committed during World War II even though
evidence of such crimes had been introduced into evidence.
The seemingly rapid development of international criminal law by
the ad hoc tribunals raises a raft of complex issues concerning the
nature of international law-making processes, some of which were
touched upon by panelist Payam Akhavan. At what point do progressive interpretations of ambiguous law breach the prohibition of retroactive justice? In larger perspective, have judges in The Hague and
Arusha crossed over from their acknowledged role in interpreting
and enforcing lex lata into the controversial terrain of enforcing lex
ferenda? Is there an appropriate place for this manner ofjudicial lawmaking in the peculiar processes of international lawmaking? As Mr.
Akhavan suggested, rulings that may be ahead of state practice and
acquiescence might invite rejection-especially when the law of The
Hague and Arusha is brought to bear against citizens of states that
are not subject to Chapter VII enforcement action.
The legitimacy of the law emanating from the ad hoc tribunals was
put to a critical test during the diplomatic conference to establish a
permanent international criminal court ("ICC") held in Rome from
June 15 to July 17, 1998. The statute adopted on the final day of that
conference provided powerful vindication of the two tribunals' jurisprudence. Indeed, many aspects of the Rome statute would have been
inconceivable without the foundation laid by the Hague and Arusha
tribunals.
Notably, crimes of sexual assault figure prominently in the enumeration of crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Further,
following the lead of the Hague Tribunal, the Rome statute's definition of crimes against humanity makes clear that there is no required
nexus to armed conflict, whether international or internal. The statute
also includes serious crimes committed during non-international
armed conflicts in its enumeration of war crimes that can be prosecuted before the ICC-a strong affirmation of the ad hoc tribunals'
jurisprudence.
Even before Rome, key aspects of the Hague and Arusha tribunals' jurisprudence had received crucial endorsement by various
states. Panelist W. Hays Parks, who is revising the United States
Joint Services Law of War Manual, noted that "the cases to date
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[from the Hague Tribunal] have been absolute gold mines of information" and have assisted him "very substantially" in his drafting.
The very existence of the Hague Tribunal has also spurred several
European countries to undertake national prosecutions, pursuant to
the principle of universal jurisdiction, of individuals charged with
committing war crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda.
A MARKER, A STEP INHISTORY
In the course of his conference remarks, M. Cherif Bassiouni acknowledged the presence in the audience of Drexel Sprecher, one of
the United States prosecutors at Nuremberg. Professor Bassiouni recalled the hopes of the Nuremberg prosecutors that their undertaking
would become the foundation for a new architecture of international
criminal justice. The officers of the Hague and Arusha tribunals who
were gathered at the Washington College of Law, Professor Bassiouni suggested, "also believe that their institutions are another step
in the course of that history."
Their belief, as well as Professor Bassiouni's leading contributions
to the ambitious project conceived at Nuremberg, received historic
affirmation a short time later. Professor Bassiouni was elected to
serve as Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court. On July 17, 1998, 120 states voted-over the negative votes of seven states, including the United States-to adopt the
statute for the court that had been drafted over the previous five
weeks.
Transforming the ICC from the concept envisioned in the Rome
statute into a viable, credible and effective institution will demand
the commitment, support, and-when necessary-criticism of a concerned and engaged public. There will be countless opportunities for
the court to founder; its success is scarcely assured. Still, when the
ICC is created, it will enjoy one significant advantage that the ICTY
and ICTR lacked: the assurance from recent example that an international court can meet extraordinary challenges, mount effective trialb,
and at last honor the humanity of those who endured epic crimes.

